We invite comments, questions, and suggestions.
financial markets, starting with the Asian crises of 1997, has led to calls for financial assistance from the wealthier nations. In December 1997, the United States announced a $5 billion commitment toward an international package of financial assistance for South Korea. Two months earlier the United States pledged $3 billion for assistance to Indonesia. In both instances, the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) was to be involved.
Established by Congress in 1934 to help stabilize the international value of the dollar, the ESF received little public attention until it was used in the provision of financial assistance to Mexico in the wake of the peso crisis of 1995. Indeed, greater scrutiny may have been inevitable given the ESF's expansion beyond its original mandate. 1 Despite the recent attention, the full range of ESF activities and the actual amount of available ESF resources are not well understood. This impedes an informed public discussion of ESF operations.
A major goal of this Economic Commentary is to facilitate accurate assessments of the amount of resources available to the ESF. First, in order to understand the uses of ESF resources, we provide an overview of ESF operations. Second, we examine the ESF balance sheet to show how "total assets" is a poor measure of the resources available to the ESF for one of its major activities, foreign-exchange intervention. Third, we discuss how any measure of ESF resources must take account of warehousing and swap lines. Finally, we suggest a better procedure for assessing the amount of resources available to the ESF. the Treasury Bulletin (see table 1 ). 4 This might seem to be a reasonable presumption since the ESF cannot unilaterally issue debt in financial markets. However, several important aspects of ESF operations are not apparent from its balance sheet. In particular, since many ESF operations use dollar assets, any limitation on the conversion of nondollar assets to dollar assets is relevant to an assessment of available ESF resources.
Intervention, the purchase or sale of foreign currencies to influence the international value of the dollar, is a major use of ESF resources (see box, opposite). The other is the provision of financial assistance to foreign countries. Whenever the ESF sells foreign currency, it produces a crediting of the ESF's (nonmarketable) U.S. government security account with the Treasury, which is equivalent to "dollar" cash assets. When purchasing foreign currency, the ESF first obtains dollar balances-possibly by selling some of its Treasury securities to the Treasury (with the Federal Reserve [hereafter, the Fed] acting as agent). The subsequent purchase of foreign exchange with dollars leaves the ESF with a lower level of Treasury securities but an offsetting increase in "foreign exchange and securities."
Thus the relevant measure of resources available for ESF interventions depends on whether foreign exchange is being bought or sold. Dollar assets are needed to buy foreign-currency-denominated assets. On the other hand, purchases of dollars are financed from international reserves, which include official holdings of gold, foreign government securities or deposits at foreign central banks, the reserve position in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and special drawing rights (SDRs). 5 ESF accounting for SDRs provides another example of why total assets is a poor measure of available resources. The SDR is an international reserve asset created by the IMF (under the First Amendment to its Articles of Agreement) to supplement existing reserve assets. The value of an SDR is determined by reference to a basket of currencies of the five largest industrial-economy member countries of the IMF. Pursuant to the Special Drawing Rights Act of 1968, SDRs allocated to the United States or otherwise acquired by the United States are resources of the ESF.
There are three SDR entries on the ESF balance sheet (see table 1 ). The SDR asset entry and the SDR liability entry, "SDR allocations," pertain to ESF linkages to the IMF. The allocations represent the current value of the provisions of SDRs by the IMF to the U.S. Treasury, which were transferred to the account of the ESF. 6 The SDR asset entry reflects the dollar value of SDR allocations to the United States plus interest earnings, valuation changes, and sales and acquisitions of SDRs from other IMF participants.
The third entry, "SDR certificates," equals the portion of the SDR assets which has already been "used." As noted earlier, all SDRs owned by the U.S. government must be held by the ESF. In other words, the ESF cannot engage in transactions with either the U.S. Treasury or the Fed that would result in a reduction in the ESF's SDR holdings. Thus, in order to convert SDRs to dollardenominated assets, the ESF issues a claim on its SDR assets to the Fed-SDR certificates-in a process called monetization. 7 While this does not decrease the SDR asset entry on the balance sheet of the ESF, it does increase the certificate number by the amount of the monetization. By law, the certificate entry cannot exceed the SDR asset entry. However, up to the limit imposed by the SDR asset total, monetization increases the size of the balance sheet, since the certificate amount increases dollar for dollar with the eventual purchase of assets (for example, foreign-currencydenominated government securities). 8 Since the monetization process increases the total asset number while decreasing the amount of SDRs available to be monetized, the certificate total must be subtracted from total assets to arrive at an estimate of the ESF's available resources. Thus, although total assets of the ESF on June 30, 1998, were $39.7 billion dollars, a slightly more accurate measure of available dollars would be $30.4 billion. This is the sum of the nonmonetized portion of the SDR total ($10 billion SDRs minus $9.2 billion SDR certificates), the entry for U.S. government securities with the Treasury ($15.7 billion), and the dollar value of the German mark and Japanese yen items ($13.9 billion).
s s Off-Balance-Sheet Financing
Congress limited the ability of the ESF to issue liabilities on its own and thus, perhaps intentionally, limited the ESF to financing new interventions through the sale of assets, a practice known as asset management. However, beyond the uses of SDRs and securities as described above the ESF can obtain additional dollar resources by moving foreign-denominated assets off-balance sheet through an arrangement with the Federal Reserve System. Thus, the $30.4 billion on-balance sheet asset number is still a flawed measure of the dollar assets available to the ESF.
The first problem is that, once the Treasury securities ("dollars") are exhausted, the ESF cannot use its German mark assets or Japanese yen assets to purchase additional mark or yen items, respectively, without first converting them into dollar-denominated assets. This conversion of the ESF's foreign currency portfolio into dollar-denominated assets requires an off-balance-sheet financing arrangement with the Fed, referred to as warehousing. Warehousing is a swap transaction in which the Fed buys foreign exchange from the ESF in a spot transaction and sells it back with a forward transaction -that is, the ESF agrees to exchange dollar assets for foreign exchange on the date the forward transaction comes due. The ESF balance sheet would thus record a decline in "foreign exchange and securities" but an increase in the "U.S. government securities" total, which could be used to purchase foreign currency or implement dollar loans to foreign countries (the forward transaction would not appear). In other words, the Fed warehousing arrangement allows the ESF to take a leveraged position in foreign assets that is not reflected on the ESF's balance sheet.
Two factors complicate the ESF's ability to use the Fed warehouse. First, the size of the warehouse is determined by FOMC deliberations. Although the size of the warehouse was increased to $20 billion to help finance the Mexican financial assistance package in 1995, it is currently limited to $5 billion with no balances currently outstanding. Second, although the currencies currently eligible for the warehouse are indicated in the Authorization for Foreign Currency Operations, they are not necessarily the same as the currencies that the ESF needs to exchange. 9
Since about 1978, warehousing has been controversial. Goodfriend (1994) argues currency-warehousing agreements between the ESF and the Fed provide the ESF with additional funding that circumvents the congressional appropriations process and statutory limits on Federal borrowing. 10 The second problem with the on-balancesheet asset measure of ESF resources is that it ignores swap lines. Swap lines, formally called reciprocal currency arrangements, are credit lines between governments (or central banks) stipulating terms which, usually for a short period of time, allow either country to borrow the other's currency. 11 The mechanics of drawing down a swap line are similar to that of warehousing-offsetting spot market and forward market transactions-except that our swap lines do not provide us with dollar assets directly but rather provide dollar assets for the other country. As in the warehousing arrangement, the forward market transaction does not appear on the balance sheet until the expiration of the swap line. 
